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Introduction 
When this seminar was planned, it was expected that the Government's intentions for 
occupational safety and health reform would be known by now. Unfortunately, that has 
not happened. Because of this, I am able to discuss only the Department of Labour's 
perception of the policy issues. What I have to say should not be taken as Government 
policy; those decisions are still to be made. 
Developments since the ACOSH proposal 
The Minister of Labour, Stan Rodger, invited submissions on the Advisory Council 
for Occupational Safety and Health proposal in June last year. He received 118 
submissions and, almost without exception, these endorsed the need for some sort of 
reform of occupational safety and health. There was much variation in the actual 
comments made, and many issues were raised. The Minister subsequently obtained 
Government approval in principle to the reform and for the issues arising from the 
ACOSH proposal and submissions to be studied by a working party of officials. The 
Government also agreed that a consultative group comprising representatives of the 
Employers Federation and the Council of Trade Unions should be set up to assist the 
officials working party. 
I was the convenor of the working party, and the other officials came from the 
Accident Compensation Corporation, the Department of Health, the Ministries of 
Transport, Energy and Environment, the Treasury and the State Services Commission. 
The working party was set up in March this year and it was required to prepare its 
report by the end of April. The working party report has been in the Government's hands 
since May but has not yet been considered for two main reasons; first the Government 
wished tQ give the consultative group members more time to prepare comments on the 
working party's recommendations, and second because of the Minister's absence overseas 
while he attended the ILO Conference. 
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Department of Labour perspective 
The fundamental policy issues are: 
What is the role of Government (if any)? 
What form should Government intervention take? 
In the case of occupational safety and health, the first question is relatively easy to 
answer. The second question is much more difficult, and there is probably no single 
correct solution. It is this latter question which was the subject of the ACOSH public 
discussion paper. 
Reasons for Government intervention 
The following points suggest that the Government should have a role: 
1. There is an expectation, shared by unions, employers, and the general community, 
that some Government intervention is necessary. The historical justification for 
occupational safety and health legislation has been: 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Management may consider the safety and health of the labour it employs to 
be unimportant and/or in the face of competitive pressures, fail to provide 
sufficient protection for those employees. 
Employees are relatively powerless to protect themselves. 
This perspective shows up in the existing occupational safety and health legislation 
which is essentially protective. It is designed to protect the rights of labour by the 
Government setting strict standards and providing various inspectorates to enforce 
them. 
Voluntary and private arrangements do not ensure the provision of adequate safety 
and health for those at work because: 
There are high costs in obtaining information about workplace hazards, the 
associated risks and the means of relieving them. 
Individuals may be limited in their ability to understand and make 
appropriate decisions from the information which is available. 
Labour market institutions can rectify these problems only slightly. 
Negotiations between the parties in the employment contract, in the absence 
of any statutory guidelines, are unlikely to produce optimal safety and health 
conditions in workplaces. 
Available statistics tend to support the view that New Zealand could improve its 
workplace safety and health performance. The cost of workplace accidents is 
considerable and much of that cost (despite the existence of accident compensation 
and public health systems) falls on those least able to protect themselves. 
The availability of comprehensive no-fault accident compensation, together with the 
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absence of the right to sue, reduces incentives for both employees and employers. 
Employers know that they will not face the possibility of paying large amounts of 
damages and employees know that they will not suffer financially if they fail to 
work carefully. 
Taking these problems into account, the conclusion can be reached that, on both 
economic efficiency and social equity grounds, some form of government intervention is 
required. 
Problems at present 
The ACOSH discussion paper identified a range of problems with present 
arrangements and I won't repeat these in detail. However, the problem is essentially one 
of fragmentation. The existing legislation is targeted at specific hazardous industries and 
situations. These have generally been introduced in response to a perception by either the 
community in general, or the administering authorities themselves, that some activity 
needs to be controlled. These laws treat different industries and hazards differently. For 
example, strict standards are applied in the construction industry while legislative standards 
are much lower (or non-existent) in agriculture. The laws are usually complex and easily 
become outdated because of technological changes. 
A further consequence of the present approach to occupational safety and health 
legislation and its enforcement is that the community in general, and management and 
labour in particular, see occupational safety and health as primarily the Government's 
responsibility. The protection of worker rights is in the form of strict liability on the 
employer rather than giving employees rights that they can exercise either singly or 
jointly at the work place. 
Criteria for a new system 
There is widespread agreement that this system should change. Any new system must 
meet certain criteria: 
The outcomes being sought should be clear. 
The costs of work illness and injury should be minimised. 
Those costs should not fall disproportionately on those least able to protect 
themselves. 
A range of measures should be available for selective use in those situations where 
they have the greatest chance of success. 
Occupational safety and health is situationally dependent. This means that measures 
which work well in one situation may be inappropriate and ineffective in others. Nor will 
rigid standards imposed by law fit the variety of situations where they must be applied. 
For these reasons global solutions must be rejected. 
If firms already have safety and health measures in place, the scope for improvements 
as a result of Government policy is less than it would otherwise be. Consequently, as a 
general principle, the preferred approach to Government intervention in occupational safety 
and health should be to direct resources to those areas where they will have the greatest 
impact. 
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Objectives for a new framework 
Based on these criteria, it is possible to develop a new approach. 
1. Management and labour should be encouraged to take greater responsibility for 
safety and health in their workplaces. At the same time, measures should be put in 
place to protect safety and health when management and labour fail to act 
responsibly. 
2. Employees should be given more ability to influence their own safety and health 
while at work. It must be recognised that the relationship between management 
and labour can not be completely equal. The employer will always have the most 
power, derived from ownership of the capital invested in the entetprise. 
3. The legislation, and the way it is administered, should be less prescriptive. That 
is, the law should focus on the ends to be achieved and the parties should be left to 
decide on the best means to achieve those ends. However, in some circumstances 
specific requirements will be necessary (such as prohibitions on particularly 
hazardous actions or materials), and the Government should ensure compliance. 
From these principles, particular policy measures can be formulated. 
Encouraging management to take greater responsibility 
Employers have little incentive at present to provide an optimal level of safety in their 
workplaces because they do not face the full cost of accidents. As part of their profit 
maximisation objective, private firms seek to minimise the cost of production. If they 
had to bear more of the damage costs, they would be more likely to allocate resources to 
prevention. 
The current reform of the Accident Compensation system provides an opportunity to 
re-examine incentives associated with accident compensation. This would go some way 
towards making management take greater responsibility. Improving incentives would be 
more likely to be successful for larger firms. Consequently, there is a role for 
Government in providing direct support to smaller firms in the form of advice about 
hazards and ways of eliminating them and/or reducing the risk of illness or injury from 
those hazards. In the event that firms fail to act responsibly, legal sanctions should be 
invoked to require adequate safety and health performance. 
Enabling employees 
A further means of encouraging management to take greater responsibility for safety 
and health is to require them to consult with those they employ. This can be done by 
enabling employees themselves to take a greater interest and responsibility for the 
conditions in which they work. At present, individual employees may ignore hazards (for 
a variety of reasons) rather than request the removal or reduction of those hazards; they 
expect an "independent" inspectorate to act on their behalf. A major reason for this 
behaviour is the imbalance of power between management and labour. The following 
measures would rectify the imbalance and enable employees to have a greater influence on 
workplace decisions affecting safety and health: 
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The right to participate in workplace decisions that affect occupational safety and 
health. 
Worker participation in workplace decisions affecting their safety and health can be 
achieved by the use of safety and health committees and representatives. Such 
committees provide a forum to which problems can be brought, possible solutions 
identified and action plans approved. 
The right to know about workplace hazards, the risks associated with them and the 
precautions able to be taken against them. 
The more information that workers have about a hazard, the more likely they are 
able to make an accurate assessment of risk. 
The right to refuse to carry out work that would result in injury or illness. 
Such a right should not be able to be exercised when to do so would place another 
person at risk. This exclusion would cover such workers as hospital and laboratory 
staff. A further exclusion would be those jobs which are inherently hazardous, 
such as emergency services, active military service, or police duties. 
The implementation of these measures would shift the emphasis for taking action on 
occupational safety and health away from the Government, bringing it before management 
and labour on a day-to-day basis rather than as a result of an infrequent visit from an 
enforcement agency. This should result in greater attention being paid to safety and health 
and a consequent reduction in accidents. 
Compliance with minimum standards 
Greater incentives for management and greater ability for employees to make better 
decisions would not in themselves be sufficient to ensure the improvement of 
occupational safety and health. Other measures would need to be included in the policy 
framework to reinforce incentives and assist those in the workplace to make more 
appropriate decisions on safety and health issues. 
The following measures would need to be carried out directly by the Government: 
Setting minimum performance standards. 
Producing information about the standards and possible means of compliance. 
Enforcing compliance with minimum standards as necessary to ensure that 
irresponsible firms and individuals do not inflict costs and pain and suffering on 
others. 
Performance standards 
In some cases, targeting particular hazards by setting specific standards and enforcing 
compliance is the most effective means of preventing accidents and injury. Consequently, 
it is a valid compliance tool in certain circumstances. These include very serious hazards 
and cases where several measures may be equally effective but some uniformity is 
necessary. 
This sort of approach is inappropriate as the sole means of achieving better safety and 
health. The alternative approach is for the law to state the performance desired. An 
example can be found in the specification of materials for the construction of spray 
booths, under the present Spray Coating Regulations. The performance being sought is a 
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two hour frre resistance. The regulations list the actual materials which may be used, 
thereby eliminating the possibility of using others. 
With a performance standard, there is more chance that employers will comply with 
the intention of the law rather than do the simple minimum necessary to comply with a 
prescriptive standard. There is also more opportunity to keep up with technological 
changes and new methods of work when performance standards are used. Prescriptive 
standards quickly become outdated. Less detail is required in performance standards so the 
volume of the law can be kept to a minimum. With specification standards, a very large 
number of standards is required to cover all hazards and this in turn increases the difficulty 
of keeping the standards up to date and increases the chance of gaps in coverage. Standards 
developed by industry, in consultation with the Government, can promote ownership of 
the solutions by the industry and increase the level of compliance. 
Producing information 
The benefits of workplace safety and. health research and information dissemination are 
not limited to those who pay for them and, consequently, there is a role for the 
Government in producing information not only concerning hazards but also about ways of 
reducing risk. This could be done by sponsoring, or directly undertaking, research into the 
hazardous agents that cause occupational accidents and ill health, and research into new 
safety technology. 
Enforcing compliance 
Enforcement of standards under this approach would be somewhat different from the 
way it is done at present. 
Enforcement officers would attempt to achieve compliance initially by ensuring the 
operation of the workplace mechanisms. 
The officers would provide the information necessary to assist both workers and 
management to make appropriate choices on prevention strategy. 
Where the actions taken in the workplace were insufficient or inadequate, the 
officers would issue directions requiring compliance. 
In serious cases, the officers would issue stop notices. 
Prosecutions would be taken in cases of serious non-compliance. 
It is also likely that the approach will vary according to the size of the firm. That is, 
larger firms would be expected to take advantage of their economies of scale and comply 
with standards with very little input from the occupational safety and health agency. If 
spot checks on such firms revealed non-compliance with standards, that would be regarded 
very seriously. Smaller frrms would require more assistance from the occupational safety 
and health agency in order to achieve compliance. 
Administration systems 
The administrative arrangements for occupational safety and health must facilitate the 
application of a consistent policy and operational approach to occupational safety and 
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health issues. The Government agency or agencies carrying out occupational safety and 
health functions must be organised in such a way that they are able to deliver effectively 
the services with which they are charged. 
The design of an administrative system for occupational safety and health will 
influence the costs incurred by employers. Dealing with occupational safety and health 
issues at the workplace will be much more costly if employers have to deal with a large 
number of separate inspectors at different times. It is therefore in the employers' interests 
to have a single point of contact with the occupational safety and health authority or 
authorities. This could be achieved either by having a single class of inspectors who 
could perform all inspection and enforcement tasks in a workplace, by better co-ordinating 
the activities of the different authorities, by amalgamation, or by setting up a separate co-
ordinating body. 
Given the broad range of functions performed by the various inspectorates, an 
inspector who could perform all necessary tasks would require an enormous investment in 
training to acquire the necessary know ledge and skills. Co-ordination is therefore a more 
feasible option, and this would be more easily achieved within a single organisation than 
among several agencies. The difficulty of achieving this co-ordination is nevertheless 
likely to be high, and should not be under-estimated even within a single organisation. 
In order to evaluate the performance of any system of occupational safety and health 
administration, it is vital that the objectives are clearly stated and that~the basis on which 
outcomes are to be based are made explicit. This requires that the lines and terms of 
accountability are made clear to decision-makers. To the extent that the activities of the 
authority are funded by Government, or are prescribed by law, there is a need for 
accountability to Parliament. There is a role for a non-Governmental body representing 
the interests of employers, workers, and the community to advise on the priorities which 
the agency or agencies should adopt and to review and comment publicly on the extent to 
which the objectives are being met. 
Conclusion 
The policy proposals I have outlined are not new. Some are applied now in New 
Zealand firms which place importance on occupational safety and health. The approach 
has also been adopted in many countries overseas. There does not seem to be any reason 
to preclude the range of proposals I have described being adopted generally in New 
Zealand. This can be done so long as it is recognised that no one solution will be 
appropriate in every situation. 
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